This article examines the issue of state bankruptcy. Since there is no uniform way to deal with the issue, attention is given to different practices and guidelines of courts' reasoning(s) on the matter. In order to answer the question of legality, as well as to confirm or disconfirm the hypothesis that sovereign state can declare bankruptcy, descriptive, analytical and comparative methods are used. The article provides a historical overview of state bankruptcies. The article also explores the existing judicial regulations, addresses the absence of international law containing a uniform or a codified bankruptcy law for states, and outlines the main principles applicable to the dispute resolution between an insolvent sovereign state and its creditors. In addition, the article analyzes the circumstances which allow states to suspend or repudiate the fulfilment of international obligations.
INTRODUCTION
Recently several European states (e.g. Greece, Latvia, Iceland) declared their inability to pay debts and warned the rest of Europe and the world of their potential bankruptcy. Contrary to the universally recognized regulation of insolvent corporations, and in some jurisdictions insolvent private persons, the issue of an insolvent sovereign state is not regulated. Unfortunately, we have no rule of law at the international level for regulating the insolvency and bankruptcy of the state.
The situations of uncertainty engendered by financial crises create many legal problems. There is little that is fair and open about unsustainable debt procedures today -usually, when a state is insolvent, disputes among the debtor and its creditors are resolved through an informal arrangement, where creditors act as judges, and representatives of the debtor countries simply accept or decline the offer advanced by the creditors. But often, because of the diversity of creditor interests and the absence of collective action clauses in all bond instruments, uncertainty is created among all participants as to how the restructuring process will unfold.
Moreover, in the absence of a special court that could under rule of law deal with sovereign state bankruptcy, problems arise with enforcing litigation and courts' decisions. Because of state immunity there is no enforcement mechanism for creditors to seize assets from an insolvent state. And certainly, there is no creditor controls on insolvent state -turnover managers cannot be dispatched to manage the state that has defaulted on its loans. Creditors cannot easily repossess the collateral that secures their debts. Creditors cannot apply legal mechanisms for transferring the assets to the creditors in the event of default. Crucially, when a state is insolvent, there is no bankruptcy ladder of priorities or equality clause.
There is also no discharge of the debtor, and no retribution for delinquents which is repudiated due to unwillingness to pay and not due purely to inability. There is no forced disclosure except via voluntary statistics.
From a legal policy standpoint, this undefined situation creates a sense of lawlessness, which is incompatible with the concept of an international legal order.
The significance of the problem of insolvent states in recent years forced academic proposals and debates at the international level on sovereign debt crisis resolution mechanisms, which are briefly discussed in this article.
The aim of this research is to affirm (or negate) the hypothesis that a sovereign state can declare bankruptcy. The article analyzes the current legal regulations, judicial practice and practices for resolving sovereign state solvency 
CURRENT PRACTICES FOR RESOLVING SOVEREIGN STATE

BANKRUPTCIES
GENERAL LEGAL PRINCIPLES DEALING WITH SOVEREIGN STATE
BANKRUPTCY
The basic function of any bankruptcy procedure is the resolution of a conflict between two fundamental legal principles: Wrongful Acts enumerates circumstances precluding wrongfulness: distress, necessity, and compliance with peremptory norms. But, in order to defend on one of the above mentioned bases precluding wrongfulness, the debtor must prove the causational link between payment of debt and these circumstances. This is very difficult to do.
Debtor protection is an essential feature of bankruptcy. When a sovereign state is insolvent, there is no bankruptcy ladder of priorities or equality clause. A priority structure is beyond debtor discretion --sovereignty uniquely empowers a government to choose the order of repayment among its creditors based on its political imperatives, financing needs, reputation concerns, or any other considerations‖. 11 A formal insolvency regime typically sets out, in general terms, how different types of claims on a distressed private company will be treated in a restructuring and the order of payment in the event of liquidation.
Internationally recognized bankruptcy law principles (which are as well entrenched Gelpern, a transparent, enforceable priority system for sovereign debt could reduce the risk of involuntary subordination, the attraction of lending to over indebted governments, and make restructuring less messy.
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-The extraordinary aspect of State bankruptcy is that it operates in a legal vacuum without a bankruptcy law.‖ 19 To summarize all of the above-mentioned judicial problems, it is assumed in this paper that the absence of state bankruptcy regulation causes problems for both creditor and debtor, and the creation of a bankruptcy procedure is needed to eliminate this judicial gap. 13 Law on the Bankruptcy of Companies of the Republic of Lithuania, supra note 12: art. 33-34; Law on the Restructuring of Companies of the Republic of Lithuania, supra note 12: art. 14.
14 Noteworthy is to mention that in some countries, certain public entities are subject to an insolvency regime. Municipalities in the United States, for example, are subject to Chapter 9 of the US Bankruptcy Code. 15 Absolute priority means that claims at the top get paid in full, those in the middle get paid in part, and those at the bottom get nothing. 16 Relative priority assures only those at the top of the priority structure better treatment than those at the bottom and nobody may get paid in full. 17 is a good example. 22 The Permanent Court of Arbitration, to which the dispute was submitted, decided:
The Imperial Ottoman Government was under an obligation to the Imperial Russian Government for the payment of moratory compensation as from 31
December 1890/12 January 1891, the date of receipt of a demand for payment that was explicit and in due form. However, inasmuch as the rights of the Imperial Russian Government under that demand for payment had in fact been extinguished as a result of the subsequent waiver by its Ambassador in Constantinople, the Imperial Ottoman Government is now under no obligation to pay interest to it according to the dates on which payment of the indemnity was effected.
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The Court found that Russia's consent was lawful, although it would otherwise have constituted a breach of an international obligation incumbent on Turkey.
Thirdly, a state can abolish the fulfilment of its financial obligations when the debt contract was illegitimate. There are certain debts which are not expected to be repaid because the debt itself is -against the law or not sanctioned by law, unfair, ISSN 2029-0405 VOLUME 3, NUMBER 1 2010
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A State cannot, for example, be expected to close its schools and universities and its courts, to disband its police force and to neglect its public services to such an extent as to expose its community to chaos and anarchy merely to provide the money wherewith to meet its moneylenders, foreign or national.
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The obligation of a government to ensure the functioning of its essential public services must take precedence over an obligation to pay its debts.
The question of economic necessity as a defense in international law was The conclusion, it must be emphasized that necessity is a temporary defense.
It is assumed in this paper that necessity should be an admissible plea when dealing with an insolvent state. But it should have certain limitations which have not been fixed with sufficient clarity. Once the necessity no longer exists, the state should have to repay the debt. In such a manner legitimate expectations of creditors would not be infringed, and dishonest debtor states would be prevented from unjust enrichment. There is a view that the creditor state must take responsibility, because loans made to developing countries did enrich them. If fulfilment of financial obligation forces the movement of funds from securing basic social needs or citizen to pay the debt for rich country, the fulfilment of such obligation could be deemed due -unreasonableness and therefore invalidity or unconstitutionality, which the State would have the burden to rebut‖ 41 . However, another view is that debt owned by the debtor is the creditor's property and by contractual obligation it must be repaid.
It has been argued that -states that assume international obligations must be expected to meet those and defend them against demands to adopt policies that 
